political grammar of European identity if we reflect a little upon this, focusing on citizenship because it will itself lead us to community.
In the theoretical literature on citizenship there are (to oversimplify an exceedingly complex matter) two different ways of approaching the subject, one often termed 'liberal', which is focused upon individual rights, the other called 'republican', concerned with political participation. The liberal approach, which is dominant both in political theory and in ordinary speech, understands citizenship in terms of the rights and entitlements of individuals. For example, have I got a passport, and if so, from which state? Do I have the right to reside in Britain and the EU? Am I entitled to social security benefits? Can I vote? The answers to these questions are matters of enormous significance for individuals, so it is not surprising that liberals, who inherit traditions of humanitarian cosmopolitanism, should sometimes have been tempted to think of citizenship as a universal human right. Short of the existence of a world state, however, citizenship can only mean membership of a particular polity, and even the supranational citizenship of the EU must be limited. Inherent in the concept of citizenship, therefore, is boundedness, and the issue of where the boundaries of citizenship are drawn.
Rules on the granting of citizenship vary enormously between different states. Even within the European Union, some are markedly more generous than others (Brubaker, 1992) . What is invariable, however, is the existence of a core of citizens whose citizenship is simply inherited, who are by chance of birth members of 'us', a bounded community. Furthermore, it is the representatives of that given community -'our' representatives -who make or amend the rules that loosen or tighten the boundaries of citizenship. In other words, although (on its liberal interpretation) citizenship may seem to be all about individual rights, it actually presupposes the existence of a defined community with the capacity for collective action -a 'we'. This is one version of a point frequently made by communitarian critics of individualistic liberalism (Mulhall and Swift, 1992) . Another version criticizes the liberal emphasis on the rights of individual citizens, on the grounds that the core of citizenship should not be a matter of individual entitlements but of shared political responsibility. Citizenship, seen from this republican viewpoint, means being an active member of the polity (Oldfield, 1990) . Political theorists who think of themselves as 'republican' rather than liberal like to recall the classical tradition of active citizenship coming down from the ancient city-state. In the Athenian democracy or the Roman Republic (according to this tradition) being a citizen meant being co-responsible for the fate of the republic, filled with a public spirit that could indeed make it an enviable fate pro patria mori. Citizens were
